Unit 3, lesson 24

Probability and Odds

How odds in favor and odds against compare an event with its complement, how to convert between odds and probability, and how the odds form of Bayes’ theorem multiplies prior odds by a likelihood ratio.

  • Video 24
  • Combining Evidence

A bag holds five labels, three that say desk and two that say locker, and one label is drawn at random. The probability of desk is 3/53/5, and the odds in favor of desk are 3 to 2. Both statements describe the same model, but probability compares the event with the whole while odds compare it with its complement, and mixing them up leads to mistakes such as believing that doubling the odds doubles the probability. This lesson converts between probabilities and odds in both directions, handles the endpoint cases, and shows that in odds form Bayes’ theorem becomes a single multiplication by a likelihood ratio.

Key terms

Odds in favor

Definition For an event AA with probability p=P(A)p = P(A), the odds in favor of AA are the ratio P(A):P(Ac)P(A) : P(A^{c}), that is p:(1−p)p : (1 - p). When p<1p < 1, the odds have the numerical value

o=p1−p,o = \frac{p}{1 - p},

which can be any number in [0,∞)[0, \infty). A ratio a:ba : b with b>0b > 0 has numerical value a/ba/b, and multiplying both parts by the same positive number gives the same odds. Because p/(1−p)p/(1 - p) increases strictly with pp on [0,1)[0, 1), a higher probability there means higher odds. At p=1p = 1 the ratio is 1:01 : 0, which has no finite numerical value. Calling it infinite odds is a convention, not a real-number quotient.

In plain words Probability asks what share of the whole the event takes. Odds compare the event’s share with the rest. Odds can exceed 11, while a probability cannot.

Example For the five labels, P(desk)=3/5P(\text{desk}) = 3/5 and the odds in favor of desk are 3/53/5 to 2/52/5, that is 3:23 : 2, with numerical value 1.51.5. The value 1.51.5 is not a probability of 150 percent. It says that desk has three parts for every two parts of its complement. An event of probability 0.20.2 has odds in favor of 0.2/0.8=0.250.2/0.8 = 0.25, usually written 1:41 : 4.

Odds against

Definition The odds against an event AA reverse the comparison, as the ratio P(Ac):P(A)P(A^{c}) : P(A). When p=P(A)>0p = P(A) > 0, they have the numerical value (1−p)/p(1 - p)/p. If 0<p<10 < p < 1, the odds against are the reciprocal of the odds in favor. At p=0p = 0 the odds in favor are 0:10 : 1, with value 00, while the odds against are 1:01 : 0, with no finite value. For ordinary finite calculations in both directions, keep pp strictly between 00 and 11.

In plain words Odds against put the complement first. An event that is 2 to 1 against has a complement twice as probable as the event itself.

Example Desk has odds 3:23 : 2 in favor, so it has odds 2:32 : 3 against, with value 2/32/3, the reciprocal of 1.51.5. An event with odds 2:12 : 1 against has odds 1:21 : 2 in favor, so its probability is 1/31/3, not 2/32/3. The number 2/32/3 is the probability of its complement.

Probability from odds

Definition If the odds in favor of AA are a:ba : b with a≥0a \ge 0, b≥0b \ge 0 and a+b>0a + b > 0, then

P(A)=aa+b,P(A) = \frac{a}{a + b},

since the event has aa parts out of a+ba + b equal parts. If the odds in favor have numerical value o≥0o \ge 0, then

P(A)=o1+o.P(A) = \frac{o}{1 + o}.

This inverts o=p/(1−p)o = p/(1 - p), because solving o(1−p)=po(1 - p) = p for pp gives p=o/(1+o)p = o/(1 + o). It maps [0,∞)[0, \infty) onto [0,1)[0, 1). Under the same conditions on aa and bb, odds of a:ba : b against give P(A)=b/(a+b)P(A) = b/(a + b).

In plain words Add the parts to get the whole, then take the event’s share. In o/(1+o)o/(1 + o) the extra 11 is the complement’s single part, since odds oo mean o:1o : 1.

Example Odds 3:23 : 2 give 3/53/5, odds 4:14 : 1 give 4/5=0.84/5 = 0.8, and the value o=1.5o = 1.5 gives 1.5/2.5=0.61.5/2.5 = 0.6. Doubling the odds does not double the probability. Start from probability 0.20.2, with odds 1:41 : 4. Doubling gives 2:42 : 4, which is 1:21 : 2, so the new probability is

11+2=13,\frac{1}{1 + 2} = \frac{1}{3},

not 0.40.4. The odds rise from 0.250.25 to 0.50.5 while the probability rises from 0.20.2 to about 0.3330.333, because the total of event and complement parts grows along with the event’s part. In general, doubling the odds of an event with probability pp in (0,1)(0, 1) gives the probability 2p/(1+p)2p/(1 + p), which is always less than 2p2p.

Likelihood ratio

Definition Let HH be a hypothesis with 0<P(H)<10 < P(H) < 1 and EE an event with P(E∣Hc)>0P(E \mid H^{c}) > 0. The likelihood ratio of EE for HH against HcH^{c} is

LR⁡(E)=P(E∣H)P(E∣Hc).\operatorname{LR}(E) = \frac{P(E \mid H)}{P(E \mid H^{c})}.

A ratio above 11 means that EE is more probable under HH, and observing EE raises the odds of HH. A ratio below 11 lowers them, and a ratio of exactly 11 leaves them unchanged. Each observation has its own ratio. For the opposite result EcE^{c}, assuming P(E∣Hc)<1P(E \mid H^{c}) < 1,

LR⁡(Ec)=1−P(E∣H)1−P(E∣Hc),\operatorname{LR}(E^{c}) = \frac{1 - P(E \mid H)}{1 - P(E \mid H^{c})},

which in general is neither 1/LR⁡(E)1/\operatorname{LR}(E) nor 1−LR⁡(E)1 - \operatorname{LR}(E). If P(E∣Hc)=0P(E \mid H^{c}) = 0 while P(E∣H)>0P(E \mid H) > 0, the finite ratio does not exist, and observing EE rules out HcH^{c}.

In plain words The likelihood ratio measures how many times as probable the evidence is under HH as under its complement. It describes the evidence, and the prior probability of HH does not enter it.

Example In the constructed alert model of Bayes’ Theorem and Base Rates, the event FF that an item is faulty plays the role of HH, the prior is P(F)=0.02P(F) = 0.02, and AA is the event of an alert. An alert has probability 0.90.9 given a fault and 0.050.05 given a sound item, so its likelihood ratio is 0.9/0.05=180.9/0.05 = 18. No alert has probabilities 0.10.1 and 0.950.95, so

LR⁡(Ac)=0.10.95=219,\operatorname{LR}(A^{c}) = \frac{0.1}{0.95} = \frac{2}{19},

which is not 1/181/18. An alert multiplies the odds of a fault by 18, and no alert multiplies them by 2/19≈0.1052/19 \approx 0.105.

Odds form of Bayes’ theorem

Definition For a hypothesis HH with 0<P(H)<10 < P(H) < 1, the prior odds of HH and, after evidence EE, the posterior odds of HH are

O(H)=P(H)P(Hc),O(H∣E)=P(H∣E)P(Hc∣E).\begin{gathered} O(H) = \frac{P(H)}{P(H^{c})}, \\[0.4em] O(H \mid E) = \frac{P(H \mid E)}{P(H^{c} \mid E)}. \end{gathered}

If P(E∣Hc)>0P(E \mid H^{c}) > 0, then P(E)>0P(E) > 0 and P(Hc∣E)>0P(H^{c} \mid E) > 0, and the odds form of Bayes’ theorem states

O(H∣E)=LR⁡(E) O(H).O(H \mid E) = \operatorname{LR}(E)\, O(H).

To see it, write Bayes’ theorem for HH and for HcH^{c}. Both fractions have the denominator P(E)P(E), which cancels in their ratio and leaves the ratio of likelihoods times the ratio of priors. For a second observation E2E_2 after E1E_1, the same rule applies to the current odds O(H∣E1)O(H \mid E_1) with the conditional likelihood ratio

LR⁡2=P(E2∣H∩E1)P(E2∣Hc∩E1),\operatorname{LR}_2 = \frac{P(E_2 \mid H \cap E_1)}{P(E_2 \mid H^{c} \cap E_1)},

assuming the conditioning events have positive probability and the denominator is positive. Then O(H∣E1∩E2)=LR⁡2 O(H∣E1)O(H \mid E_1 \cap E_2) = \operatorname{LR}_2\, O(H \mid E_1). The ratio LR⁡2\operatorname{LR}_2 equals the single-observation ratio P(E2∣H)/P(E2∣Hc)P(E_2 \mid H)/P(E_2 \mid H^{c}) when the two observations are conditionally independent given HH and given HcH^{c}.

In plain words In odds, updating is multiplication. Start with the prior odds, multiply by how many times as probable the evidence is under the hypothesis as under its complement, and convert back to a probability at the end if that is what the question asks for.

Example In the alert model the prior odds of a fault are 0.02:0.98=1:490.02 : 0.98 = 1 : 49. An alert has likelihood ratio 1818, so the posterior odds are 18:4918 : 49 and

P(F∣A)=1818+49=1867,P(F \mid A) = \frac{18}{18 + 49} = \frac{18}{67},

about 0.2690.269. No alert has likelihood ratio 2/192/19, so the posterior odds are 149⋅219=2931\tfrac{1}{49} \cdot \tfrac{2}{19} = \tfrac{2}{931}, that is 2:9312 : 931, and

P(F∣Ac)=22+931=2933,P(F \mid A^{c}) = \frac{2}{2 + 931} = \frac{2}{933},

about 0.00210.0021. Both answers agree with the direct use of Bayes’ theorem. An alert multiplied the odds of a fault by 18 but the probability only by about 13, from 0.020.02 to about 0.2690.269.

Check yourself

  1. An event has probability 0.750.75. Give its odds in favor and its odds against. Then find the probability of an event whose odds against are 2:12 : 1.
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The odds in favor are 0.75:0.25=3:10.75 : 0.25 = 3 : 1, with value 33, and the odds against are 1:31 : 3, with value 1/31/3. Odds of 2:12 : 1 against give the complement two parts and the event one part, so the probability is 1/(1+2)=1/31/(1 + 2) = 1/3. Reading 2:12 : 1 as odds in favor would give 2/32/3, which is the probability of the complement.

  1. An event has prior probability 1/41/4. Evidence is three times as likely when the event holds as when it does not. Find the posterior odds and probability. A second observation then has likelihood ratio 22, where both of its probabilities also condition on the first observation. Find the new probability, and explain what goes wrong if you multiply the probability by 33 and then by 22.
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The prior odds are 14:34=1:3\tfrac14 : \tfrac34 = 1 : 3. Multiplying by the likelihood ratio 33 gives odds 1:11 : 1, so the posterior probability is 1/21/2. The second ratio doubles the odds to 2:12 : 1, so the probability becomes 2/32/3. Multiplying probabilities instead would give 3⋅14=343 \cdot \tfrac14 = \tfrac34 after the first step, which is already wrong, and 2⋅34=322 \cdot \tfrac34 = \tfrac32 after the second, which is not a probability at all. The first piece of evidence tripled the odds but only doubled the probability.

  1. In the alert model, with prior 0.020.02 and alert probabilities 0.90.9 given a fault and 0.050.05 given a sound item, an alert appears on the main screen and is copied to a second screen. Find the posterior odds and probability of a fault. What would they be if the second alert came instead from a separate detector with the same rates, conditionally independent of the first given the item’s state?
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The copy carries no new information. Given either state, the second screen shows an alert whenever the first does, so its conditional likelihood ratio given the first alert is 1/1=11/1 = 1. The posterior odds stay 18:4918 : 49 and the probability stays 18/67≈0.26918/67 \approx 0.269. A separate, conditionally independent detector has conditional likelihood ratio 1818 again, so the posterior odds become 18⋅18:49=324:4918 \cdot 18 : 49 = 324 : 49 and the probability is 324/373≈0.869324/373 \approx 0.869. Multiplying by 18 twice for the copied screen would count one alert as two.

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