Unit 12, lesson 94

Expected utility and Kelly growth

How expected utility and log utility lead to the Kelly criterion, why the positive-wealth constraint limits the stake, and how the Kelly fraction of a binary wager maximizes expected log growth.

  • Video 94
  • Growth, dynamic allocation and liabilities

A repeated wager pays a net profit of 1.21.2 per unit staked with probability 0.580.58 and loses the stake otherwise, so each unit staked earns 0.2760.276 on average. Among stakes up to all current wealth, staking everything maximizes expected wealth after one round, and the first loss then leaves nothing. Which fraction of current wealth should be staked each round? This lesson sets up expected utility and the positive-wealth domain of log utility, derives the Kelly fraction that maximizes expected log growth for a binary opportunity, and shows what an overestimated win probability does to growth.

Key terms

Expected utility

Definition Fix the probability measure P\mathbb{P} under which outcomes are evaluated, the physical or a subjective one rather than a pricing measure, a set A\mathcal{A} of admissible decisions and, for each a∈Aa \in \mathcal{A}, a terminal wealth W(a)W(a) whose values lie in an interval DD. For a utility function UU on DD, expected-utility maximization chooses a∈Aa \in \mathcal{A} to maximize

EP[U(W(a))]\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}\bigl[U(W(a))\bigr]

over the decisions for which this expectation exists. An increasing UU prefers more wealth to less. If UU is concave and WW is integrable, Jensen’s inequality gives

EP[U(W)]≤U(EP[W]),\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[U(W)] \le U\bigl(\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[W]\bigr),

so the sure amount EP[W]\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[W] is at least as good as the gamble WW, which is what risk aversion means. For strictly concave UU the inequality is strict unless WW is almost surely constant. For a continuous, strictly increasing UU, the certainty equivalent of WW is the sure wealth CE\mathrm{CE} with U(CE)=EP[U(W)]U(\mathrm{CE}) = \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[U(W)], and a concave UU gives CE≤EP[W]\mathrm{CE} \le \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[W]. Replacing UU by α+c U\alpha + c\, U with constants α\alpha and c>0c > 0 leaves every ranking unchanged.

In plain words Expected utility scores each possible outcome by what it is worth to the decision maker, not by its size, and averages the scores with the probabilities. A concave utility makes each extra unit of wealth worth less than the one before, so a gamble is never preferred to a sure payment of its mean.

Example In the wager, staking the fraction ff of initial wealth W0W_0 gives EP[W1]=W0(1+0.276f)\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[W_1] = W_0 (1 + 0.276 f), which increases with ff, so the linear utility U(W)=WU(W) = W picks the largest stake allowed. With log utility and W0=1W_0 = 1, the stake 0.230.23 gives EP[ln⁡W1]≈0.031590\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[\ln W_1] \approx 0.031590 and the certainty equivalent e0.031590≈1.03209e^{0.031590} \approx 1.03209, below the mean 1+0.23⋅0.276≈1.063481 + 0.23 \cdot 0.276 \approx 1.06348. The stake 11 leaves zero wealth with probability 0.420.42, so its expected log utility is −∞-\infty.

Log utility

Definition Log utility is U(W)=ln⁡WU(W) = \ln W for W>0W > 0. Its derivatives U′(W)=1/W>0U'(W) = 1/W > 0 and U′′(W)=−1/W2<0U''(W) = -1/W^2 < 0 make it strictly increasing and strictly concave, and its relative risk aversion

−W U′′(W)U′(W)=1-\frac{W\, U''(W)}{U'(W)} = 1

is the same at every wealth level. It is undefined for W≤0W \le 0 and tends to −∞-\infty as W→0W \to 0 from above, so a decision under which W≤0W \le 0 has positive probability is excluded, because its expected log utility is −∞-\infty or undefined. Since ln⁡(W0X)=ln⁡W0+ln⁡X\ln(W_0 X) = \ln W_0 + \ln X, multiplying every outcome by W0>0W_0 > 0 adds the constant ln⁡W0\ln W_0. Decisions whose terminal wealth is W0W_0 times a multiplier XX that does not depend on W0W_0 are therefore ranked the same way at every level of wealth, and the best fraction to stake does not depend on current wealth.

In plain words Log utility measures wealth in percentage terms. Halving wealth lowers it by exactly as much as doubling wealth raises it, and losing everything is infinitely bad.

Example A gamble that doubles or halves wealth with probability 12\tfrac12 each has mean 1.25 W01.25\, W_0, yet its expected log utility is ln⁡W0+12ln⁡2+12ln⁡12=ln⁡W0\ln W_0 + \tfrac12 \ln 2 + \tfrac12 \ln \tfrac12 = \ln W_0, so under log utility its certainty equivalent is exactly W0W_0. At the stake 0.230.23 in the wager, a win adds ln⁡1.276≈0.24373\ln 1.276 \approx 0.24373 to log wealth and a loss subtracts ∣ln⁡0.77∣≈0.26136\lvert \ln 0.77 \rvert \approx 0.26136. A loss costs more log wealth than a win adds, and only the higher win probability makes the average positive.

Positive-wealth constraint

Definition Let RR be the return per unit staked of one round of an opportunity, and let the stake be the fraction ff of current wealth, with unstaked wealth held as cash at zero interest. A fraction f>1f > 1 borrows at zero interest and a fraction f<0f < 0 takes the opposite side. Wealth then moves from WW to W(1+fR)W(1 + fR). The positive-wealth constraint requires

P(1+fR>0)=1,\mathbb{P}(1 + fR > 0) = 1,

and the fractions that satisfy it are the admissible fractions for log utility. They form an interval containing 00, because 1+fR1 + fR is affine in ff. For the binary opportunity with R=bR = b with probability pp and R=−1R = -1 otherwise, where 0<p<10 < p < 1 and b>0b > 0, the conditions 1+bf>01 + bf > 0 and 1−f>01 - f > 0 give

−1b<f<1.-\frac{1}{b} < f < 1 .

Position limits, such as a ban on negative stakes or a borrowing limit, shrink this interval further. If RR is unbounded below, every f>0f > 0 has P(R<−1/f)>0\mathbb{P}(R < -1/f) > 0, so no positive stake is admissible, and if RR is unbounded above, no negative stake is. If 1+R1 + R is lognormal, the admissible fractions are exactly 0≤f≤10 \le f \le 1. For these, 1+fR=(1−f)+f(1+R)>01 + fR = (1 - f) + f(1 + R) > 0, while for f>1f > 1 the event 1+R≤1−1/f1 + R \le 1 - 1/f and for f<0f < 0 the event 1+R≥1+1/∣f∣1 + R \ge 1 + 1/\lvert f \rvert both have positive probability.

In plain words Before asking which stake is best, ask which stakes keep wealth strictly positive in every possible outcome. A stake that can wipe out wealth in some outcome with positive probability is not a candidate, however rare that outcome is.

Example In the wager b=1.2b = 1.2, so the admissible fractions are −0.8333<f<1-0.8333 < f < 1. The stake 11 is excluded. Each loss would leave zero wealth, and with p=0.58p = 0.58 the chance of surviving ten rounds is 0.5810≈0.00430.58^{10} \approx 0.0043. For a stock whose gross return 1+R1 + R over one period is lognormal, any borrowing f>1f > 1 gives a positive probability, however small, that the period ends with nonpositive wealth. So log utility over one period without rebalancing inside the period rules out every leveraged position.

Expected log growth

Definition Let R1,R2,…R_1, R_2, \dots be independent copies of RR, let ff be admissible, and rebalance to the fixed fraction ff at the start of every round with no costs, so that

Wn=W0∏t=1n(1+fRt).W_n = W_0 \prod_{t=1}^{n} (1 + f R_t) .

The expected log growth of ff is g(f)=EP[ln⁡(1+fR)]g(f) = \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[\ln(1 + fR)], in natural log units per round. Taking logs turns the product into a sum, and if EP[∣ln⁡(1+fR)∣]<∞\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}\bigl[\lvert \ln(1 + fR) \rvert\bigr] < \infty, the strong law of large numbers gives

1nln⁡WnW0→g(f)\frac{1}{n} \ln \frac{W_n}{W_0} \to g(f)

almost surely. Hence Wn→∞W_n \to \infty almost surely when g(f)>0g(f) > 0, and Wn→0W_n \to 0 almost surely when g(f)<0g(f) < 0, and eg(f)e^{g(f)} is the long-run geometric growth factor per round. When g(f)=0g(f) = 0 the strong law alone does not settle the long-run behavior. The mean behaves differently. If EP[∣R∣]<∞\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[\lvert R \rvert] < \infty, independence gives EP[Wn]=W0(1+f EP[R])n\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[W_n] = W_0 \bigl(1 + f\, \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[R]\bigr)^n, and Jensen’s inequality gives eg(f)≤1+f EP[R]e^{g(f)} \le 1 + f\, \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[R]. For the binary opportunity,

g(f)=pln⁡(1+bf)+(1−p)ln⁡(1−f).\begin{aligned} g(f) &= p \ln(1 + bf) \\[0.4em] &\quad + (1 - p) \ln(1 - f). \end{aligned}

In plain words Compounding multiplies and logarithms add, and an average of many independent log changes settles at its expectation. So the expected log of one round’s multiplier is the rate at which almost every long path compounds. It says nothing about how rough the path is on the way.

Example At f=0.23f = 0.23 the growth is g≈0.58⋅0.24373−0.42⋅0.26136≈0.031590g \approx 0.58 \cdot 0.24373 - 0.42 \cdot 0.26136 \approx 0.031590 per round, a long-run growth factor of about 1.032091.03209, while expected wealth grows by the factor 1.063481.06348 per round. In one simulated sequence of a million rounds, the average log change was 0.031500.03150 with a standard error of 0.000250.00025, in line with gg. The same growth rate allows ten losses in a row. In any given ten rounds they occur with probability 0.4210≈0.000170.42^{10} \approx 0.00017, and they leave 0.7710≈0.07330.77^{10} \approx 0.0733 of wealth.

Kelly criterion

Definition The Kelly criterion chooses the admissible fraction f∗f^{*} that maximizes the expected log growth gg, or, for several opportunities with return vector RR, the admissible vector ff that maximizes EP[ln⁡(1+f⊤R)]\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[\ln(1 + f^{\top} R)]. This is the same as maximizing the expected log utility of next-round wealth. All expectations in this card are under P\mathbb{P}. With independent, identically distributed rounds and integrable log multipliers it has two growth properties, which hold inside the probability model and need the true law of RR. First, let the stake ftf_t of round tt be admissible and depend only on the outcomes of earlier rounds. Since RtR_t is independent of those outcomes, the conditional mean of ln⁡(1+ftRt)\ln(1 + f_t R_t) given them is g(ft)g(f_t), so

E[ln⁡Wn]=ln⁡W0+∑t=1nE[g(ft)]≤ln⁡W0+n g(f∗),\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[\ln W_n] &= \ln W_0 \\[0.4em] &\quad + \sum_{t=1}^{n} \mathbb{E}\bigl[g(f_t)\bigr] \\[0.4em] &\le \ln W_0 + n\, g(f^{*}), \end{aligned}

and the fixed fraction f∗f^{*} maximizes expected log terminal wealth at every horizon. Second, if g(f∗)>g(f)g(f^{*}) > g(f) for a fixed fraction ff, then on the same sequence of outcomes Wn(f∗)/Wn(f)→∞W_n(f^{*})/W_n(f) \to \infty almost surely, because the log of the ratio divided by nn tends to g(f∗)−g(f)>0g(f^{*}) - g(f) > 0. For small positions there is a quadratic approximation. If ∣fR∣≤c<1\lvert fR \rvert \le c < 1 almost surely, Taylor’s theorem gives ln⁡(1+x)=x−x2/2+r(x)\ln(1 + x) = x - x^2/2 + r(x) with ∣r(x)∣≤∣x∣3/(3(1−c)3)\lvert r(x) \rvert \le \lvert x \rvert^3/\bigl(3(1 - c)^3\bigr) for ∣x∣≤c\lvert x \rvert \le c, so

g(f)=f E[R]−12f2 E[R2]+rˉ(f),\begin{aligned} g(f) &= f\, \mathbb{E}[R] - \tfrac12 f^2\, \mathbb{E}[R^2] \\[0.4em] &\quad + \bar{r}(f), \end{aligned}

with

∣rˉ(f)∣≤∣f∣3 E[∣R∣3]3(1−c)3,\lvert \bar{r}(f) \rvert \le \frac{\lvert f \rvert^3\, \mathbb{E}\bigl[\lvert R \rvert^3\bigr]}{3(1 - c)^3},

and the quadratic part is maximized at E[R]/E[R2]\mathbb{E}[R]/\mathbb{E}[R^2]. Replacing E[R2]\mathbb{E}[R^2] by Var⁡(R)\operatorname{Var}(R) is a further approximation, close when E[R]2\mathbb{E}[R]^2 is small compared with Var⁡(R)\operatorname{Var}(R). Neither approximation enforces the positive-wealth constraint. Log-growth formulas for continuously rebalanced diffusion models come from Itô’s formula and assume continuous paths, so they do not account for losses from jumps.

In plain words Kelly picks the stake that makes wealth grow fastest in the long run when the probabilities are known. Staking more than Kelly takes more risk and lowers growth. Staking less gives up some growth in exchange for smaller swings.

Example For the wager E[R]=0.276\mathbb{E}[R] = 0.276, E[R2]=0.58⋅1.44+0.42=1.2552\mathbb{E}[R^2] = 0.58 \cdot 1.44 + 0.42 = 1.2552 and Var⁡(R)≈1.1790\operatorname{Var}(R) \approx 1.1790. The two approximations give 0.276/1.2552≈0.21990.276/1.2552 \approx 0.2199 and 0.276/1.1790≈0.23410.276/1.1790 \approx 0.2341, against the exact Kelly fraction 0.230.23. They are rough here, since a win makes fR=0.276fR = 0.276, which is not small. Half the Kelly stake, 0.1150.115, has growth about 0.0236680.023668, about 7575 percent of the maximum and close to the ratio 3/43/4 that holds exactly for a quadratic objective, and its loss multiplier is 0.8850.885 instead of 0.770.77. Ten losses in a row then leave about 0.29470.2947 of wealth instead of 0.07330.0733. Twice the Kelly stake, 0.460.46, has growth about −0.00386-0.00386, where a quadratic objective maximized at 0.230.23 would give 00.

Kelly fraction

Definition Suppose the rounds are independent, each pays b>0b > 0 per unit staked with probability pp and loses the stake with probability 1−p1 - p, where 0<p<10 < p < 1 are the true probabilities, there are no costs, and ff ranges over the admissible interval −1/b<f<1-1/b < f < 1. Then

g′(f)=pb1+bf−1−p1−fg'(f) = \frac{p b}{1 + bf} - \frac{1 - p}{1 - f}

and

g′′(f)=−pb2(1+bf)2−1−p(1−f)2<0,\begin{aligned} g''(f) &= -\frac{p b^2}{(1 + bf)^2} \\[0.4em] &\quad - \frac{1 - p}{(1 - f)^2} < 0, \end{aligned}

so gg is strictly concave. Setting g′(f)=0g'(f) = 0 and multiplying by the positive denominators gives pb(1−f)=(1−p)(1+bf)p b (1 - f) = (1 - p)(1 + bf), and the unique maximizer is the Kelly fraction

f∗=p−1−pb=EP[R]b.f^{*} = p - \frac{1 - p}{b} = \frac{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[R]}{b} .

It lies inside the admissible interval for every such pp and bb, since 1+bf∗=p(1+b)>01 + bf^{*} = p(1 + b) > 0 and 1−f∗=(1−p)(1+b)/b>01 - f^{*} = (1 - p)(1 + b)/b > 0, and it is positive exactly when the expected profit EP[R]=pb−(1−p)\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[R] = pb - (1 - p) per unit staked is positive. With q=1/(1+b)q = 1/(1 + b), the win probability that would make the wager fair, f∗=(p−q)/(1−q)f^{*} = (p - q)/(1 - q) and

g(f∗)=pln⁡pq+(1−p)ln⁡1−p1−q,\begin{aligned} g(f^{*}) &= p \ln \frac{p}{q} \\[0.4em] &\quad + (1 - p) \ln \frac{1 - p}{1 - q}, \end{aligned}

the relative entropy of the true probabilities with respect to the fair ones, which is positive unless p=qp = q. If stakes are restricted to an interval inside the admissible one, concavity makes the best allowed stake the point of that interval nearest f∗f^{*}, for example 00 when negative stakes are not allowed and f∗<0f^{*} < 0.

In plain words Stake the expected profit per unit staked divided by the net odds. A wager without an edge gets no stake, and a wager whose edge is small relative to its odds gets a small stake, however attractive the odds look.

Example For p=0.58p = 0.58 and b=1.2b = 1.2, the Kelly fraction is 0.58−0.42/1.2=0.23=0.276/1.20.58 - 0.42/1.2 = 0.23 = 0.276/1.2, and q=1/2.2≈0.4545q = 1/2.2 \approx 0.4545 gives (0.58−0.4545)/0.5455≈0.23(0.58 - 0.4545)/0.5455 \approx 0.23 as well. The multipliers are p(1+b)=1.276p(1 + b) = 1.276 and (1−p)(1+b)/b=0.77(1 - p)(1 + b)/b = 0.77. The probability 0.580.58 is a constructed input, not something the model can estimate. If the true probability is 0.510.51, the Kelly fraction is 0.51−0.49/1.2≈0.101670.51 - 0.49/1.2 \approx 0.10167 with growth about 0.0061730.006173. The stake 0.230.23 chosen for 0.580.58 then has growth about −0.003766-0.003766 under the true probabilities, although the expected profit per unit staked, 0.51⋅1.2−0.49=0.1220.51 \cdot 1.2 - 0.49 = 0.122, is still positive. Under p=0.51p = 0.51 the growth is positive only for stakes between 00 and about 0.2030.203, so overestimating the edge turns a growing strategy into one whose wealth tends to zero almost surely.

Check yourself

  1. A wager pays 11 per unit staked with probability 0.60.6 and loses the stake otherwise. Find the Kelly fraction, the two wealth multipliers and the expected log growth. What is the best nonnegative stake if the win probability is 0.450.45 instead?
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With b=1b = 1 the Kelly fraction is f∗=0.6−0.4/1=0.2f^{*} = 0.6 - 0.4/1 = 0.2, the expected profit per unit staked divided by the odds. A win multiplies wealth by 1.21.2 and a loss by 0.80.8, and

g(0.2)=0.6ln⁡1.2+0.4ln⁡0.8≈0.10939−0.08926≈0.02014,\begin{aligned} g(0.2) &= 0.6 \ln 1.2 \\[0.4em] &\quad + 0.4 \ln 0.8 \\[0.4em] &\approx 0.10939 - 0.08926 \\[0.4em] &\approx 0.02014, \end{aligned}

a long-run growth factor of about 1.020341.02034 per round. With win probability 0.450.45 the formula gives 0.45−0.55=−0.10.45 - 0.55 = -0.1, a stake on the opposite side. If negative stakes are not allowed, the strictly concave growth function has its maximizer below 00, so it decreases on [0,1)[0, 1), and the best allowed stake is 00, with growth 00. If the opposite side were available at the same odds, the stake −0.1-0.1 would give the growth 0.45ln⁡0.9+0.55ln⁡1.1≈0.005010.45 \ln 0.9 + 0.55 \ln 1.1 \approx 0.00501.

  1. For the wager of question 1 with win probability 0.60.6, someone stakes f=0.5f = 0.5 every round, arguing that a positive expected profit makes any stake profitable. Compare the expected wealth after 100100 rounds with the wealth after a typical sequence of 100100 rounds.
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Each round multiplies expected wealth by 1+0.5⋅0.2=1.11 + 0.5 \cdot 0.2 = 1.1, so EP[W100]=1.1100 W0≈13781 W0\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[W_{100}] = 1.1^{100}\, W_0 \approx 13781\, W_0. The expected log growth is

g(0.5)=0.6ln⁡1.5+0.4ln⁡0.5≈0.24328−0.27726≈−0.03398,\begin{aligned} g(0.5) &= 0.6 \ln 1.5 \\[0.4em] &\quad + 0.4 \ln 0.5 \\[0.4em] &\approx 0.24328 - 0.27726 \\[0.4em] &\approx -0.03398, \end{aligned}

which is negative, so wealth tends to zero almost surely. A sequence with 6060 wins and 4040 losses, the most likely count, ends at 1.560⋅0.540 W0≈0.0334 W01.5^{60} \cdot 0.5^{40}\, W_0 \approx 0.0334\, W_0. The mean is carried by rare sequences with many wins. The growth is positive only for stakes below about 0.3890.389, roughly twice the Kelly fraction 0.20.2, so the argument confuses the sign of the edge with the size of the stake.

  1. An opportunity returns 0.080.08 with probability 0.60.6, 00 with probability 0.380.38 and −0.5-0.5 with probability 0.020.02 per unit invested. Cash and borrowing earn zero interest, and any real fraction ff may be chosen. Find the admissible fractions, the Kelly fraction and the quadratic approximation E[R]/E[R2]\mathbb{E}[R]/\mathbb{E}[R^2]. Is the approximation admissible?
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Positive wealth needs 1+0.08f>01 + 0.08 f > 0 and 1−0.5f>01 - 0.5 f > 0, so the admissible fractions are −12.5<f<2-12.5 < f < 2. The middle outcome contributes ln⁡1=0\ln 1 = 0, so

g(f)=0.6ln⁡(1+0.08f)+0.02ln⁡(1−0.5f),\begin{aligned} g(f) &= 0.6 \ln(1 + 0.08 f) \\[0.4em] &\quad + 0.02 \ln(1 - 0.5 f), \end{aligned}

a strictly concave function. Its derivative 0.048/(1+0.08f)−0.01/(1−0.5f)0.048/(1 + 0.08 f) - 0.01/(1 - 0.5 f) vanishes when 0.048(1−0.5f)=0.01(1+0.08f)0.048 (1 - 0.5 f) = 0.01 (1 + 0.08 f), that is, 0.038=0.0248f0.038 = 0.0248 f, so

f∗=0.0380.0248=9562≈1.5323,f^{*} = \frac{0.038}{0.0248} = \frac{95}{62} \approx 1.5323,

with growth about 0.040320.04032 per round. This stake borrows about 0.530.53 of wealth, and a crash leaves 1−0.5⋅1.5323≈0.23391 - 0.5 \cdot 1.5323 \approx 0.2339 of wealth. For the approximation, E[R]=0.048−0.01=0.038\mathbb{E}[R] = 0.048 - 0.01 = 0.038 and E[R2]=0.6⋅0.0064+0.02⋅0.25=0.00884\mathbb{E}[R^2] = 0.6 \cdot 0.0064 + 0.02 \cdot 0.25 = 0.00884, so E[R]/E[R2]≈4.2986\mathbb{E}[R]/\mathbb{E}[R^2] \approx 4.2986. That fraction is not admissible, since a crash would leave 1−0.5⋅4.2986≈−1.1491 - 0.5 \cdot 4.2986 \approx -1.149 times wealth. The expansion needs ∣fR∣\lvert fR \rvert to be small, and in the crash it is not.

How this lesson connects